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Strengthening Incentives for Student Effort and Learning: 
Michigan’s Merit Award Program? 
 
 
 One of the primary reasons American students learn a good deal less during secondary 
school than students in other industrialized nations is that they devote less time and intellectual 
energy to the task.1  Accountability systems designed to get teachers to try harder and set higher 
standards will not produce more student learning if [as one high school teacher put it] “students 
are sitting back in their desks, arms crossed, waiting for their teachers to make them smart (Zoch, 
1998, p. 70).” 
 Learning is not a passive act; it requires the time and active involvement of the learner.  In 
a classroom with 1 teacher and 25 students, there are 25 learning hours spent for every hour of 
teaching time.  Learning takes work and that work is generally not going to be as much fun as 
hanging out with friends or watching TV.  If students cannot be motivated to give up some time 
socializing or watching TV so that they can learn difficult material and develop high level skills, the 
time and talents of teachers will be wasted.   
 An important reason for establishing the Michigan Merit Award program is to motivate 
secondary school students to take their studies more seriously Other states have chosen to tackle 
the student motivation problem by requiring students to pass a battery of minimum competency 
examinations (MCES) before they get a high school diploma.  This approach was challenged in  
Debra P. vs. Turlington, 644F.2d 397 (5th  Circuit 1981) and in GI Forum et. al. vs. Texas  
Education Agency.   The implementation of Florida’s graduation requirement was delayed, but 
was eventually allowed.  The Texas case was decided in the state’s favor on January 7, 2000. 
 Michigan chose not to go down this path largely because it wanted the MEAP HST to 
reflect more challenging learning goals than would be possible if the MEAP exams were being 
used to set minimum standards for high school graduation.2  It also probably did not want to take 
the risk that an MCE would lower high school graduation rates and college attendance rates.  
Instead it took the modest step of putting MEAP HST scores on high school transcripts, 
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something, for example, that Connecticut does with it’s CAPT, Ohio does with its 12th grade Tests 
and New York and North Carolina do with their end-of-course exams.   
 In 1999 Michigan took the further step of offering a one year $2500 scholarship to students 
who meet or exceed “Michigan standards” on four MEAP HST tests: Reading, Mathematics, 
Science and Writing.  The Merit Award is intended: 
First…to recognize and reward Michigan students who play by the rules, 
study hard, achieve on their tests and meet high standards.  Second, by 
making postsecondary education more affordable, it encourages students to 
stay in school and pursue additional education and training after high 
school.  Third, as the “Michigan Merit Award becomes a “household name” 
in Michigan, even more students will be inspired to raise their performance 
because they will know the scholarship is available to anyone who is willing 
to study hard and achieve.  Finally, by creating a meaningful incentive for 
schools to excel and by motivating parents to demand a high quality 
education for their children, the scholarship program will promote improved 
school performance in the state.3 
This is an ambitious set of objectives for a program whose annual budget is considerably less 
than 1 percent of total spending on K-12 education in the state of Michigan.4  Nevertheless, it is 
well designed for simultaneously achieving all four of these objectives.  It has every chance of 
significantly raising student effort levels, increasing high school completion and college 
attendance rates, improving the educational climate in most schools and strengthening the 
resolve of parents and teachers to improve school performance. The key design decision that 
allows the program to simultaneously serve all four objectives is the decision to base awards on 
MEAP achievement examinations that reflect the state’s recommended curriculum and are graded 
by the state’s teachers.  If  the awards had been based on a predictive aptitude test like the ACT 
that is poorly aligned with the state’s curriculum, the demand for Kaplan ACT prep courses would 
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have risen but parental pressure for educational excellence would not have been stimulated and 
school climate would not improve.  If awards had been based on high school GPA, objectives 1 
and 2 might have been served  to some degree, but many students would have responded by 
choosing unchallenging courses where A’s are easy to get. Most importantly, there would be no 
incentive for schools to become better and for teachers to set higher standards. To the contrary, 
pressure on teachers to inflate grades would have intensified.  
  The paper is organized in four sections.  In the first section I document the lack of 
engagement of American secondary school students and compare the time they devote to 
schoolwork to the time their overseas counterparts spend on schoolwork.   Section 2 assesses the 
social costs of student disengagement and lack of effort.  Students who blow off high school pay a 
very high price; a much larger price than they imagine when they are in school.  They imagine 
they will be able to go to college regardless of low grades, regardless of low achievement.  But, in 
fact, their chances of completing a degree program are almost zero.  They are also unaware that 
applying themselves in high school helps them get jobs that offer training and promotion 
opportunities and eventually higher wage rates. Section 3 analyzes the structure of the Merit 
Award program and shows how it attacks the problem of motivating students to become more 
engaged in their studies.  Section 4 provides evidence on the likely effects of the program by 
reviewing studies of other moderate stakes external examination systems in other states and in a 
number of Canadian provinces.   
 
I. The Student Motivation Problem 
No matter how you look at it, American secondary schools have a serious student 
motivation problem.  At the completion of his study of American high schools, Theodore Sizer 
(1984) characterized students as, "All too often docile, compliant, and without initiative (p. 54)."  
John Goodlad (1983) described: "...a general picture of considerable passivity among 
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students…(p. 113)."  The high school teachers surveyed by Goodlad ranked "lack of student 
interest" as the most important problem in education.  
 Time on Task:  The low effort levels of American students also evidence themselves in 
studies of time on task.  Classroom observation studies have found that students actively engage 
in a learning activity for only about half the time they are scheduled to be in school.  A study of 
schools in Chicago found that public schools with high-achieving students averaged about 75 
percent of class time for actual instruction; for schools with low achieving students, the average 
was 51 percent of class time (Frederick, 1977).  Overall, Frederick, Walberg and Rasher (1979) 
estimated 46.5 percent of the potential learning time is lost due to absence, lateness, and 
inattention.  
 Studies of time allocation using the reliable time diary method have found that the average 
number of hours per week in school is 25.2 hours for primary school pupils, 28.7 hours for junior 
high students and 26.2 hours for senior high students.  The comparable numbers for Japan are 
38.2 hours for primary school, 46.6 hours for junior high school and 41.5 hours for senior high 
school (Juster and Stafford 1990).  Since studies have found learning to be strongly related to 
time on task (Wiley 1986; Walberg 1992), these large differentials in time committed to learning 
are an important reason for the lag of American students behind Japanese students  in math and 
science.   
 Homework: Harris Cooper's (1989) meta-analysis of randomized experimental studies 
found that students assigned homework scored about one-half a standard deviation higher on 
post tests than students not receiving homework assignments.  The impact of homework on the 
rate at which middle school students learn was also significant, though somewhat smaller.  There 
was no evidence of diminishing returns as the amount of homework assigned increased.  
Nonexperimental studies indicate that the relationship between homework and learning is linear. 
 Nevertheless, homework is not even assigned in some classes.  Arthur Powell describes 
one school he visited: 
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 Students were given class time to read The Scarlet Letter, The Red Badge of 
Courage, Huckleberry Finn, and The Great Gatsby because many would not read 
the books if they were assigned as homework.  Parents had complained that such 
homework was excessive. Pressure from them might even bring the teaching of 
the books to a halt....[As one teacher put it] "If you can't get them to read at home, 
you do the next best thing.  It has to be done....I'm trying to be optimistic and say 
we're building up their expectations in school."(Powell, Farrar and Cohen 1985, 
p.81) 
 
 In the High School and Beyond Survey, students reported spending an average of only 3.5 
hours per week on homework (National Opinion Research Corporation 1982).  Time diaries 
yielded similar estimates for the early 1980s: 3.2 hours for junior high school and 3.8 hours for 
senior high school.  Time diaries for Japanese students reveal that they spent 16.2 hours per 
week studying outside of school in junior high school and 19 hours a week studying in senior high 
school (Juster and Stafford 1992).   
 Homework assignments have increased since the early 1980s but hours spent doing 
homework remain low.  In a 1991 survey, 29 percent of American 13 year olds said they were 
doing two or more hours of homework daily.  The proportion doing more than two hours of 
homework was equally low in Canada and Portugal and even lower in Scotland and Switzerland.  
In most counties the proportion was higher: 79 percent in Northern Italy, 63-64 percent in Ireland 
and Spain, 50-58 percent in Israel, Hungary, France, Jordan and the former Soviet Union and 41-
44 percent in Brazil, Korea, Taiwan and China (NCES 1992b Table 387).   
 A remarkably large number of students do not do the homework they are assigned.  In the 
Educational Excellence Alliance’s (EEA) survey of 21,535 students in Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, only 55 percent said they did all their homework, 
29 percent said they did most of their homework and 16 percent said they did none or only some 
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of their homework.  When we analyzed who has a high GPA, the single best predictor was the 
share of homework done, not race, parents education or self reported ability. 
 Other Uses of Time: When homework is added to engaged time at school, the total time 
devoted to study, instruction, and practice in the U.S. is only 18-22 hours per week -- between 16 
and 20 percent of the student's waking hours during the school year.  By way of comparison, the 
typical high school senior spent nearly 10 hours per week in a part-time job (NORC 1982) and 
19.6 hours per week watching television.  Thus, TV occupies as much time as learning.   
 While some students are overscheduled and find it difficult to fit homework into their busy 
schedule, most have lots of free time.  In the EEA survey 58 percent of students said they spend 
two or more hours per day watching TV.  Fifty-two percent said they spend two or more hours a 
day talking with friends and hanging out.  
 Numerous studies conducted in a variety of countries have found that time spent watching 
TV is negatively correlated with student performance in school (IAEP 1992).  In Table 1 we can 
see that secondary school students in other industrialized nations watch much less television: 55 
percent less in Finland, 70 percent less in Norway and 44 percent less in Canada.  Note that in 
                        Table 1— 
Time Use By Students 
 
 Hours Watching T.V per Week         Reading Time per Week   
                    Students Adults                         Students 
                U.S.   19.6        15.9  1.4 
                Austria     6.3      10.6  4.9 
                Canada   10.9     13.3  1.5 
                Finland     9.0        9.0  6.0  
                Netherlands   10.6  13.4  4.3 
                Norway     5.9       7.2  4.3 
                Switzerland     7.7     9.0  4.8 
 
Source: Hours spent per week on each activity derived from time diary studies.  Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development, Living Conditions in OECD Countries , 1986, Tables 18.1 & 18.3. 
                                                                                                                                      
other countries high school students watch less TV than adults; in the United States they watch 
more.  Reading takes up 6 hours of a Finnish student's non-school time per week, 4.8 hours of 
Swiss and Austrian students time but only 1.4 hours of an American students time. 
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II.  The Social Costs Of Student Disengagement And Lack Of Effort 
Who suffers when students fail to devote sufficient time and effort to learning in high 
school?  Not corporate America, they can respond to shortages of skilled workers by moving 
critical functions abroad and simplifying the jobs that stay in the U.S..  Profits need not decline.  It is 
the students who lose.  They lose in two ways.  
First, their college aspirations end up not being fulfilled.  Just about everybody wants to go 
to college—even those with poor grades and low test scores.  Completing a college program, 
however, depends on the quality of the student’s preparation in high school.  For high school 
sophomores who tested in the top quartile in 1980, 62 percent actually got a bachelors degree in 
the next 12 years and another 7.2 percent got an associates degree.  What about students in the 
bottom quartile of the test score distribution?  Seventy five percent of them said, when they were 
high school sophomores, that they intended to go to college.  But, twelve years later only 3.3 
percent of them had actually obtained a bachelors degree and only 4.1 percent had gotten an 
Associates degree. Other student background characteristics—parent’s education, race, socio-
economic status also  influence the probability of going to and completing college but none has as 
powerful an effect on actual outcomes.5  Many students appear to believe that they do not need to 
apply themselves in high school to achieve their goal of going to and completing college.  They 
know that a local college will admit them even if they don’t know how to spell or write a coherent 
paragraph.   What they do not realize is that if they have not developed these and other basic skills 
in high school, actually completing a degree program is going to be extremely difficult.6 
Low achievers will also pay a price by having to work in low wage jobs offering little job 
security and few chances for advancement.  We seldom measure the actual literacy levels of 
adults but when we do we find that literacy has at least as big an effect on earnings and 
unemployment as years of schooling.  Table 2 presents evidence for this assertion from the 
National Adult Literacy Survey.  Adults in the bottom prose literacy group earn one-third as much 
as those in the top literacy group and were 6.5 times more likely to be unemployed. High school 
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dropouts, by contrast, earned 43 percent of what college graduates earn and were 2.6 times more 
likely to be unemployed.7 
Table 2— 
Impact of Literacy and Schooling on the Earnings and Unemployment of Males 
 Prose 
Literacy 
Earnings Unemployment
Rate--1992 
 Schooling Earnings Unemployment 
Rate--1992 
 
 Level  1 $48,965 2.3 %  BA or more $38,115 4.8 %  
 Level  2 $39,941 4.1 %  Assoc. 
Degree 
$31,855 5.5 %  
 Level  3 $29,610 6.4 %  13-15 Yrs $27,279 7.4 %  
 Level  4 $22,046 11.5 %  12 Yrs $22,494 8.2 %  
 Level  5 $15,755 14.9 %  9-11 Yrs $16,194 12.4 %  
 
Source: National Adult Literacy Survey of 1992, National Center for Education Statistics, Literacy in the Labor Force,  
 
Altonji and Pierret’s study of how scores on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) 
taken while a teenager effect subsequent labor market success provides estimates of the 
magnitude of the effects of literacy and basic skills in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  They are 
presented in Figure 1.  Controlling for a contemporaneous measure of completed schooling, they 
found that a one standard deviation (4-5 grade level equivalent) higher AFQT score was 
associated with only a 2.8 percent increase in wage rates the first year out of school but a 16 
percent increase 11 years later.8  By contrast, the percentage impact of a year of schooling 
decreased with time out of school from 9.2 percent for those out just one year to 3 percent for 
those out for 12 years.   
Literacy’s effect on wages is initially small because employers seldom know which job 
applicants have the literacy skills they seek. Over time, however, employers learn which 
employees are the most competent by observing job performance.  Those judged most competent 
are more likely to get further training, promotions and good recommendations when they move on.  
Poor performers are encouraged to leave.  Since academic achievement in high school is 
correlated with job performance,9 the sorting process results in basic skills assessed during high 
school having a much larger effect on the labor market success of 30 year olds than of 19 year 
olds.10 
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 The long delays before the benefits of academic achievement in high school start accruing  
send students the wrong signal.  Teenagers know that college educated adults have good jobs 
and live in large attractive houses.  That’s why so many want to go to college. They do not know 
whether the successful adults they see in their community took rigorous courses and studied hard 
in high school.  As we saw above they will observe almost no relationship between academic 
achievement of their older siblings/friends and the quality of their jobs.  So it would be reasonable 
for youngsters to conclude that while credentials are rewarded by employers, learning is not.  If 
that is the conclusion they draw, many will pursue a strategy of studying just hard enough to get 
the diploma and be admitted to college, but no harder. 
 
Fig. 1--The Effect of Schooling and Academic 
Achievement on Wage Rates-- (Altonji & Pierret)
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
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Source: Analysis of NLSY data by Altonji & Pierret 1997
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III.  Motivating Students To Pay Attention In Class 
And Study Harder ? 
 
 How can incentives for classroom engagement and hard study be increased?  Lets begin 
by examining what student say motivates them to work hard in school.  In 1998/99 the 
Educational Excellence Alliance (EEA) surveyed 35,000 students in 135 high schools in New 
York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Connecticut and Pennsylvania.  Students were asked “When 
you work really hard in school, which of the following reasons are most important for you?”   
The most frequently cited reasons were extrinsic and future oriented. 
· “I need the grades to get into college”……...    79 % 
· “Help me get a better job”……………..…….    58 % 
Parents came in second: 
· “To please or impress my parents”……..….     55% 
· “My parents put pressure on me”…………..     44% 
Intrinsic motivation placed third. 
· “The subject is interesting”……………….....   42 % 
Teachers came in fourth: 
· “My teachers encourage me to work hard”…    31 % 
· “The teacher demands it”…………………....   22 % 
· “To please or impress my teacher”……….....   22 % 
 
Multiple regression analysis of the EEA data confirmed the finding that prospects of going to 
college were the single most important reasons for working in high school.  Holding other  
characteristics of the student body constant,  schools with large numbers of students citing “need 
the grades to get into college” as their reason for working hard tended to have higher levels of 
classroom engagement and fewer students not doing their homework.   
 Some have proposed to strengthen incentives to study in high school by raising the 
minimum academic standard students must reach before they will be admitted to any post-
secondary institution.  This would be unwise for three reasons. Most people feel that society 
should offer everyone, no matter their age or how many mistakes they have made in the past, the 
opportunity to go back to school and try to make something better out of the rest of their life.  The 
adolescent culture of high schools makes them alien territory for adults.  Only colleges with open 
door admissions policies can serve this 2nd chance, 3rd chance function.  Secondly, Michigan has 
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set a goal of expanding participation in post-secondary education.  Ending open-door admissions 
policies might prevent that objective from being realized.   Finally, denying admission to all colleges 
[not just one particular college] is clearly a high stakes decision.  One would not want to base such 
an important decision solely on test scores from a single battery of tests.  
 Michigan has chosen a much wiser course. It’s Merit Award program is well designed to 
simultaneously induce parents and teachers to set higher standards, induce students to study 
harder and increase college attendance rates.  It has a number of positive features. 
1. Conditioning awards on achievement makes absolutely transparent what students and 
parents must do to seize the opportunity.  Students are being urged to study harder and to 
sign up for more demanding courses.  The extra learning this produces benefits the student 
regardless of whether she ends up getting a merit award.  By contrast, need–based financial 
aid programs  often send no signal, a murky signal or the wrong signal and stimulate 
undesirable behavior.   The rules for determining eligibility for need-based financial aid are 
highly complex and vary from institution to institution.  Many low and moderate income 
parents are not aware that generous need-based financial aid will be forthcoming if their child 
is admitted to University of Michigan or Michigan State University, so they do not urge their 
children to set their sights high and to build the kind of academic record that would get them 
into the state’s flagship institutions.  At the other end of the spectrum are the growing number 
of savvy parents who   arrange their finances to maximize their eligibility for financial  aid.  
Here are some of the strategies recommended by the financial aid guide books:  
<  Do not create an education trust fund in your child’s name. Financial aid formulas tax such 
assets at an extremely high rate.  
<  Put as many as possible of your own assets into 401k plans and IRAs.  These are not 
counted as assets  in financial aid formulas. 
<  In the year before your child enters college, Minimize your adjusted gross income on your 
federal tax return by having a Schedule C business with lots of deductible expenses. 
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2. Scholarship eligibility is open ended.  The award goes to every student who meets or 
exceeds the absolute standard.  Everyone in the school has the potential of getting the 
scholarship; not just the best student in French or Music or the students who rank in the top 
10 percent of the graduating class.  These other kinds of merit scholarships have the 
dysfunctional effect of pitting classmates against each other.  Students who win these 
traditional merit scholarships are honored by their parents, but their classmates see them as 
nerds, suck ups or “Oreos.”   That is why many schools stopped awarding these honors at 
compulsory daytime school assemblies. There were too many incidents of cat calls mixed 
with unenthusiastic applause.  The Merit Award, by contrast, helps to reduce anti-nerd peer 
pressure.  Students who joke around in class or try to get the teacher off track will no longer 
be honored and rewarded by peers because their  disruptions make it harder for the rest of 
the class to get the $2500 award.  
3. Basing the Merit Award on an external assessment brings the educational goals of students, 
parents and teachers into alignment.  Prior to the Merit Award program students and parents 
benefited little from administrative decisions opting for higher standards, more qualified 
teachers or a heavier student work load.  The immediate consequences of such decisions--
higher taxes, more homework, having to repeat courses, lower GPA's, complaining parents, 
a greater risk of being denied a diploma--were negative.  As a result, parents pressured 
teachers to be easy graders and were reluctant to vote higher tax levies so more highly 
qualified high school teachers could be recruited.  The Merit award program will make 
parents stronger advocates of higher standards and better teaching. 
4. The Merit Award standard was set at a level that is achievable by almost all students. The 
cut point is in the fat middle part of the distribution of student achievement, so incentive 
effects are maximized.  Few will feel the HST tests are so difficult, they have no chance of 
being recognized for meeting Michigan standards. 
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5.  The special long term financing of the program means that parents of 9 year olds can be 
confident it will be there for their child when she finishes high school.  This maximizes  
incentive effects because confidence in the future availability of the Merit Award improves 
student attitudes and effort throughout their school career not just during the junior and 
senior year of high school.  This is one of the reasons why “I Have a Dream” programs often 
have such salutary effects on student motivation and success.11   Studies of the impacts of 
need-based financial aid have found strong effects on which college students attend, but 
they have not been able to establish that it has large effects on the overall college 
attendance rates.  One reason for this second finding may be that key decisions are made in 
middle school about courses taken and how hard to try and middle school students from low 
income families are unaware that they will be eligible for generous financial aid if they build a 
solid academic record.  
6. The centralized grading of the extended answer portions of MEAP exams by Michigan 
teachers is a very positive feature of the program. Having to agree on what constituted 
excellent, good, poor, and failing responses to essay questions or open-ended math 
problems results in a sharing of perspectives and teaching tips that the teachers find very 
helpful.  In May 1996 I interviewed a number of teachers union activists about the 
examination system in the Canadian province of Alberta.  They universally reported that 
serving on grading committees was  “…a wonderful professional development activity (Bob, 
1996).”  
7. The scholarship is modest in size and lasts for only one year.  Consequently the selection of 
scholarship winners is a low or moderate stakes decision not a high stakes decision.12 
Because the stakes are moderate not high, the APA’s recommendation that decisions be 
made on the basis of multiple indicators does not apply to the award of merit awards on 
the basis of MEAP test scores. 13  
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8. No one is made worse off.   In fact, those who do not meet Michigan standards and do not 
get a Merit award will find it easier to get conventional need-based aid.  Michigan colleges 
will tend to be redirect their budgets for student assistance towards those not eligible for 
Merit awards.  
9. The Merit Award Program is a small part of an integrated and balanced system of 
financing higher education and assisting students to attend college.   Many of the other 
components of this funding system target their funds on disadvantaged and minority 
students. Families with incomes below $100,000 are eligible for a federal tax credit of up 
to $1500 for each student going to college.  This probably yielded Michigan families about 
$366,000,000 in tax credits last year.14   In addition to the tax credits, federal student aid 
programs provided Michigan undergraduates $235,206,000 in need based grants and 
interest subsidies in fiscal 1997 (NCES, 1998, Table 365, p. 416). Institutions of higher 
education in Michigan awarded $466,289,000 in scholarships and grants in fiscal 1996 
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Table 3 
 
New York State Student Achievement compared to other States in the early 1990s 
 
 
 
 
 
NYS Partici- 
pation 
Rate 
Parents 
Educ. 
Index 
Prop. 
Black 
Prop. 
His-
panic 
Prop. 
Foreign 
Born 
Prop. 
In 
Poverty 
Prop. 
Private 
School 
Prop. 
Large 
School 
Prop. 
3+ Math 
Courses 
Prop. 
3+ Eng. 
Courses 
R Sq/ 
RMSE 
Mean/ 
Std 
Dev 
1992 NAEP 
Math 
8th Grade 
9.6 
(2.1)**  
68** 
(2.7) 
-32*** 
(6.1) 
-1 
(.1) 
-66*** 
(3.2) 
-.52** 
(2.5)     
.831 
4.23  
              
Total SAT 46** 
(2.7) 
-.68** 
(2.6) 
370*** 
(6.4) 
-.135 
(3.2) 
   60 
(1.6) 
-44* 
(1.8) 
85 
(1.3) 
-36 
(  .3) 
.926 
14.8 
925 
55 
SAT 
Independent 
Variables--Mean 
 
.027 
 
.414 
 
.581 
 
.078    
 
.207 
 
.120 
 
.617 
 
.797   
Std. Deviation .164 .240 .097 .064    .082 .113 .067 .038   
 
Source: Analysis of 1991 state average scores on the NAEP mathematics assessment and the summed math and verbal SAT-I tests.  
The mean and standard deviation for the variables used in the SAT analysis are in rows 5 and 6 of the table.   NAEP test results are 
reported on a scale where a grade level equivalent is about 10 points. 
 
*** p < .01 on a two tail test 
**  p < .05 on a two tail test 
*    p < .10 on a two tail test  
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much of which was need-based and went to undergraduates. The Merit Award program adds 
about $100,000,000 annually to the student aid pot, less than one-tenth of the total.  In 
addition, state and local government appropriated  $1,927,812,000 to support higher 
education institutions in fiscal 1996.15  Almost all of these funds support the instructional 
function of these institutions and directly benefited students.  The state funding was roughly 
$4,727 per student.  Without these state funds, tuition would have doubled or tripled, pricing 
many low and moderate income students out of college.  College students also benefit from a 
host of other state and federal subsidies: the deductibility gifts to higher education and the tax 
exempt status of land and buildings and endowment income.  Thus the Merit Award program 
is just a tiny piece--3.4 percent--of total public subsidies of higher education in the state of 
Michigan.  It’s the merit piece of an overall higher education funding plan that devotes more 
than six times as much money to need-based student financial aid.  
The Merit Award program is well designed to achieve its objectives of stimulating greater student 
effort and raising academic standards.  What do the experiences of other states and nearby 
Canadian provinces tell us about its likelihood of success.  We turn now to a review of that 
evidence. 
 
 
IV. The Effects of Moderate Stakes Curriculum-Based External Exit Exams 
on Student Achievement and High School Climate 
 
 How has the Merit Award program changed the incentives faced by Michigan students? 
Prior to the Merit Award program, the measures of student competence that were rewarded were 
ACT test scores and grade point averages.   MEAP HSTs were no-stakes exams and many 
student were blowing them off.  What has changed?  First, the rewards for learning increased.  
Second, the Merit Awards changed how student achievement was defined and rewarded.. ACTs 
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scores and GPAs still matter but now state-developed curriculum-based external assessments of 
achievement matter as well.  By this step Michigan created a low/moderate stakes curriculum-
based external exit exam system.  What’s a curriculum-based external exit exam system 
(CBEEES)?  It: 
    1. Produces signals of student accomplishment that have real consequences for the 
student.  
    2. Defines achievement relative to an external standard, not relative to other students 
in the classroom or the school.  Fair comparisons of achievement across schools and 
across students at different schools are now possible.  Costrell's (1994) analysis of the 
optimal setting of educational standards concluded that more centralized standard setting 
(state or national achievement exams) results in higher standards, higher achievement and 
higher social welfare than decentralized standard setting (i.e. teacher grading or schools 
graduation requirements).  
    3. Is organized by discipline and keyed to the content of specific course sequences.  
This focuses responsibility for preparing the student for particular exams on one (or a small 
group of) teacher/s.  
4.  Signals multiple levels of achievement in the subject.  If only a pass-fail signal is 
generated by an exam, the standard will have to be set low enough to allow almost everyone 
to pass and this will not stimulate the great bulk of students to greater effort (Kang 1985; 
Costrell 1994).  
3. Sponsored by and developed to the specifications of the department that funds and 
regulates elementary and secondary education in the state.   External exit exams must 
be aligned with the state’s curriculum. State control facilitates curriculum reform because 
coordinated changes in instruction and in exams are feasible.   The exams are more likely to 
be used for school accountability and this magnifies it’s effects on school culture and student 
effort..  Tests established and mandated by other organizations serve the interests of other 
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masters.  America’s most influential high stakes exams--the SAT-I and the ACT—serve the 
needs of colleges to sort students by aptitude not the needs of high schools to reward 
students who have learned what the school is trying to teach.  When state government has 
developed the exam, it is more likely to take responsibility for how much students learn and 
make the necessary changes in school funding, teacher licensing and professional 
development regulations. 
5.  Covers all or almost all secondary school students.  
6.  Assess a major portion of what students studying a subject are expected to know or 
be able to do.  It is, however, not essential that the external exam assess every instructional 
objective.  Teachers can be given responsibility for evaluating dimensions of performance 
that cannot be reliably assessed by external means. 
 High stakes curriculum based external exam systems are found throughout East Asia and 
in much of Europe—e.g. England, Scotland, Ireland, France, Italy, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, 
Poland, Russia, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. Careful empirical analysis of data 
from the 40 nation Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS)  has found that 
teaching is more rigorous and students learn more in nations with CBEEES.16  Analysis of data 
from TIMSS found that students from countries with CBEEE systems outperform students from 
other countries at a comparable level of economic development by 1.3 U.S. grade level equivalents 
in science and by 1.0 U.S. grade level equivalent in mathematics.  A similar analysis of 
International Assessment of Educational Progress data on achievement in 1991 of 13 year olds in 
15 nations found that students from countries with CBEEES outperformed their counterparts in 
countries without CBEEES by about 2 U.S. grade level equivalents in math and about two-thirds of 
a US grade level equivalent in science and geography.  Analysis of data from the International 
Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement’s study of reading literacy of 14 year 
olds in 24 countries found that students in countries with CBEEES were about 1.0 U.S. grade level 
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equivalent ahead of students in nations at comparable levels of development that lacked a 
CBEEES.17 
 In some of these nations the stakes attached to exam results are extremely high.  It is quite 
legitimate to question how relevant these findings are for predicting the likely effects of low and 
moderate stakes CBEEES systems like the one in Michigan. While most nations with CBEEESs 
have gone the high stakes route, some have not—e.g. Canada and the Netherlands.  We will look 
at Canada.  In addition, two American states—New York and North Carolina--have had moderate 
stakes CBEEES for many years.  CBEEES systems are being phased in elsewhere in the U.S. but 
none of these states had a system up and running in the late 1990s that combined scale with 
student consequences.  
Evidence from Canada:  In 1990-91  Alberta, British Columbia, Newfoundland, Quebec 
and Francophone New Brunswick had curriculum-based provincial examinations in Language Arts 
during junior year and  second language, mathematics, biology, chemistry, and physics during the 
senior year of high school.  The other provinces did not have curriculum-based provincial external 
exit examinations.  The exams were developed by teachers selected by the Ministry of Education 
and graded by teachers in centralized locations. Exam scores accounted for 50 percent of that 
year's final grade in Alberta, Newfoundland and Quebec and 40 percent in British Columbia.  While 
exam results appeared on transcripts, college admissions decisions were based almost entirely on 
high school grades and were generally made before the senior year exams were graded. 
I  assessed the effects of these diploma exam systems by analyzing 1991 International 
Assessment of Educational Progress data on mathematics and science achievement of 8th graders 
in 1362 Canadian schools.  I  found that controlling for the size and structure of the school and 
social background of it’s students, schools in provinces with CBEEES were a statistically significant 
one-half of a U.S grade level equivalent ahead in math and science of comparable schools in 
provinces without CBEEES.18   
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 The impacts of CBEEES on school policies and instructional practices were also studied.  
CBEEES were not associated with higher teacher-pupil ratios or greater spending on K-12 
education. They were, however, associated with higher teacher salaries, a greater likelihood of 
having middle school teachers specialize in teaching one subject in middle school and a greater 
likelihood of hiring teachers who have majored in the subject they will teach.  Schools in CBEEES 
provinces devoted more hours to math and science instruction and built and equipped better 
science labs.  The number of computers and library books per student were unaffected by 
CBEEES.19 
   Fears that CBEEES would cause the quality of instruction to deteriorate appear to be 
unfounded.  Students in CBEEES jurisdictions were less likely to say that memorization was the 
way to learn the subject and more likely to do experiments in science class.  Apparently, teachers 
subject to the subtle pressure of an external exam four years in the future adopted strategies that 
are conventionally viewed as "best practice," not strategies designed to maximize scores on 
multiple choice tests.  Quizzes and tests were more common, but in other respects a variety of 
indicators of pedagogy were no different in CBEEES jurisdictions.  Students were not less likely to 
like the subject and they were more likely to agree with the statement that science is useful in every 
day life.  Students also talked with their parents more about school work and reported their parents 
had more positive attitudes about the subject.  
  New York and North Carolina’s Moderate Stakes CBEEES: Begun in the 1860s, 
New York State’s curriculum-based Regents Examination System is the oldest American 
example of end–of-course examinations (EOCE). A college bound student taking a full schedule 
of Regents courses would typically take Regents exams in mathematics and earth science at 
the end of 9th grade; mathematics, biology and global studies exams at the end of 10th grade; 
mathematics, chemistry, American history, English and foreign language exams at the end of 
11th grade and a physics exam at the end of 12th grade. For students the stakes attached to 
Regents exams were pretty modest.  Each district decided whether Regents exam grades were to 
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be a part of the course grade and how much weight to assign to them.  While almost all districts 
counted Regents exam results as a final exam grade, teachers or departments generally gave their 
own final as well so when grades on finals were averaged in with quarterly marking period grades, 
Regents exam scores seldom accounted for more than an eighth of the student’s final grade in a 
course.  Eligibility for a “Regents” as opposed to a local diploma depended on passing the Regents 
exams, but the benefits of getting a “Regents” diploma have declined and have been small for the 
last two decades.  During the 1950s and 60s Regents exam scores were used to select winners of  
Regents scholarships.  Regents exam grades also appeared on high school transcripts, but in 
recent years college admissions decisions depended primarily on grades and SAT scores, not 
Regents exam scores or Regents diplomas.20 
 North Carolina introduced End-Of-Course (EOC) tests for Algebra 1 and 2, Geometry, 
Biology, Chemistry, Physics, Physical Science, U.S. History, Social Science and English 1 
between 1988 and 1991.  Except for a four year interlude in which some tests were made a 
local option, all students taking these courses were required to take the state tests.  Easier 
versions of these courses not assessed by a state test do not exist, so virtually all North 
Carolina high school students take at least six of these exams.  Test scores are reported 
separately on the student’s transcript.  Most teachers have been incorporating EOC exam 
scores into their course grades and a state law now mandates that, starting in the year 2000, 
the EOCE test scores must have at least a 25% weight in the final course grade.  
 How are North Carolina and New York doing?  Did student test scores go up in North 
Carolina after they implemented their end-of course exams.  Yes they did.  In fact according to 
Grissmer, Flanagan, Kawata and Williamson (2000), 4th and 8th grade test scores rose more 
rapidly from 1990 to 1996 in North Carolina than in any other state.21  While suggestive, such a 
finding is not conclusive.  North Carolina was introducing other accountability policies--rewards 
for school improvement and sanctions for poor performance--at the same time, so the increase 
in 8th grade test scores could be due to these efforts not the CBEEES.  
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 New York has had the Regents exams for more than one hundred years, so there is no 
reason to expect particularly rapid test score gains.  The effects of the Regents exam system 
can be studied by examining cross section data as was done in the international and Canadian 
studies described above.     
  New York's students are more disadvantaged, more heavily minority and more likely to be 
foreign born than students in most other states.  Consequently, when one compares student 
achievement levels, family background must be taken into account.  Considering the high 
incidence of at-risk children, New York students do remarkably well. Table 3 presents the results of 
a linear regressions predicting 1992 NAEP math scores and 1991 mean SAT-M + SAT-V test 
scores for all states for which data are available.  With the exception of the dummy variable for 
New York State, all right hand side variables are proportions--generally the share of the test taking 
population with the characteristic described. In the analysis of 8th grade math scores the controls 
for student background were: the proportion of people under age 18  who live in poverty, a 
schooling index for the adult population, percent foreign born, percent public school students who 
are black and percent public school students who are Hispanic, parent’s education, the poverty 
rate,  percent black and percent foreign born all had significant effects on math achievement in the 
expected direction.  New York State’s mean NAEP math score was a statistically significant 9.6 
points (or about one grade level equivalent) above the level predicted by the regression model.   
[Table 3 about here] 
 In the analysis of SAT test score means, the control variables were a parents’ education 
index, percent black,  percent in private schools, percent in large schools, percent who had taken 3 
or more courses in math and English and the percent of high school graduates who take the SAT.  
New Yorkers did significantly better (46 points better) on the SAT than students of the same race 
and social background living in other states.  For individuals the summed SAT-V + SAT-M has a 
standard deviation of approximately 200 points.  Consequently, the differential between New York 
State's SAT mean and the prediction for New York based on outcomes in the other 36 states is 
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about 20 percent of a standard deviation or about three-quarters of a grade level equivalent 
(Bishop, Mane and Moriarty 2000).      
 Further evidence on the effect of New York’s CBEEES system comes from an analysis 
of test score gains between 8th and 12th grade that will appear shortly in the Brookings Papers 
on Education Policy.  The results of our analysis of NELS:88 data are presented in Figure 2.  
We found significantly larger test score gains (about 40 % of a grade level equivalent) by 
students in New York (Bishop, Mane, Bishop and Moriarty 2001).  Increases in the number of 
courses required to graduate and minimum competency exams did not have significant effects 
on test score gains.  
This paper also analyzed 1996 and 1998 state cross section data on 8th grade NAEP 
reading, mathematics and science test scores.  Our models included controls for the following 
demographic characteristics of the students attending school in the state: the share of children 
living in poverty, parental education, the share of public school students who are African-
Figure 2--Effects of Graduation Requirements on 8th
to 12th Grade Test Score Gains by GPA in 8th Grade
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American, the share who are Hispanic and the share who are Asian-American.  States that have 
moderate or high stakes tests for students tend to have also adopted school accountability 
systems that reward high achieving schools or sanction failing schools that do not improve 
during the early 1990s.  This means that unbiased estimates of the effect of minimum 
competency exams and CBEEES are possible only when the presence or absence of other 
standards-based reform initiatives is taken into account.  We, therefore, studied the impact of 
four different policies:  
1. Rewards for schools that improve on statewide tests or exceed targets set for them 
2. Sanctions for failing schools—closure, reconstitution, loss of accreditation etc. 
3. Minimum competency exams 
4. Moderate Stakes Curriculum-based External Exit Exam System—i.e. the New 
York/North Carolina stakes for students policy mix during the 1990s22 
  Results of the analysis are presented in Figure 3. The policy that clearly had the biggest 
effects on test scores is the moderate-stakes curriculum-based external exit exam system.  In 
science and mathematics 8th graders in New York and North Carolina were one-half of a grade 
level equivalent (GLE) ahead of comparable students in states without minimum competency 
exams or CBEEES. They were also a 63 percent of a GLE ahead in reading.  
 Stakes for teachers and schools also had significant effects on all three measures of 8th 
grade achievement.  Students living in states that in 1996/7 were both rewarding successful 
schools and threatening to sanction failing schools were about 28 percent of a GLE ahead in all 
three subjects of students in states that did neither.  Public reporting is necessary for the 
implementation of these other policies but on its own it had no discernable effect on student 
achievement. Point estimates for the impact of minimum competency exams were positive but 
small and only one of the three coefficients was significant at the 10 percent level on a one tail 
test. 
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 Michigan—first year effects of the Merit Award program:  What does the behavior of 
the first cohort of students eligible for Michigan Merit Awards, the class of 2000, tell us about the 
effects of the program.  Table 4 presents data collected from the Michigan Department of 
Education, the State Budget Office and the Merit Award program tracking the number of people 
taking and passing MEAP HST exams.  The first two columns of the table report the number of 
students who took and passed the MEAP HST during the spring of 1998 and 1999.  Governor 
Engler proposed the Merit Award program in January 1999, four months before the high school 
juniors were supposed to take the HST test in May.  While the authorizing legislation didn’t pass 
until a couple of months later, passage was expected throughout the spring and most students 
were aware that taking and passing all the HST tests would probably result in their getting a 
$2500 scholarship.  Consequently, the very large (11,316) increase between 1998 and 1999 in 
the numbers taking the reading HST was at least in part due to the announcement of the 
program.  
Figure 3--Effects of Standards-Based Reform 
Initiatives on 1996-98 NAEP 8th Grade Test Scores
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 The third column of the table gives counts for the graduating class of 2000.  Most of 
these students first took the HST in spring 1999.  The 10,473 increase in numbers taking the 
reading HST are students who took the HST in either fall 1999 or Spring 2000 after not taking 
the test in spring 1999.  This number would almost certainly been a lot smaller in the absence of 
the Merit Award program.   
 Not only did the number of students taking the exam go up, the number of students 
demonstrating that they met or exceeded Michigan’s education goals rose dramatically.  In 
reading, for example, the number of students meeting standard increased by 13,733 between 
spring 1998 and spring 1999 and then by another 8032 by the time the class of 2000 had 
completed senior year.  The proportion of test takers meeting the goals went up significantly. 
 Did college attendance go up?  Data is not available on the college attendance rate of 
students in the Class of 2000.  There is data, however, on trends in the number of students in 
each graduating class who took the ACT test and how they did on the test.  Since the ACT test 
is the college admissions test used by almost all Michigan colleges and universities, the count of  
Table 4:  Michigan Public School Students Who Met or Exceeded State Standards on the MEAP 
High School Tests  
  Spring 
1998 
Spring 
1999 
Class of 
2000 
Math 
Endorsed (% of Tested) 
Number Endorsed 
Increase from Previous Year 
60.5 % 
43,122 
63.6 % 
53,632 
10,510 
64.8 % 
59,592 
5,960 
Reading 
Endorsed (% of Tested) 
Number Endorsed 
Increase from Previous Year 
58.9 % 
42,216 
67.3 % 
55,949 
13,733 
69.4 % 
63,981 
8,032 
Science 
Endorsed (% of Tested) 
Number Endorsed 
Increase from Previous Year 
51.7 % 
36,559 
51.0 % 
41,911 
5,352 
55.6 % 
50,723 
8,812 
Writing 
Endorsed (% of Tested) 
Number Endorsed 
Increase from Previous Year 
56.6 % 
39,104 
52.5 % 
41,868 
2,764 
58.4 % 
51,608 
9,740 
# Public School Students who took the High 
School Test in Reading 
70,401 81,717 92,190 
Number of Students in graduating class 
Eligible for Merit Award 
  42,000 
 
Data for 1998 and 1999 are for first-time test takers in the Spring administration of  the MEAP HST. Source: It is from “MEAP Scores Reflect At Least 
20,000 Students Eligible for Merit Scholarships” at www.meritaward.state.mi.us/whatsnew/newsrel/1999/092899_2.htm.   The data for the Class of 
2000 is for the graduating class of 2000 and represents the highest test score for students who had multiple opportunities to take the test before 
graduating in 2000.  It is from www.meritaward.state.mi.us/merit/meap/results/data/2000summary.htm.  
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students taking this test is a good indicator of trends in the number of students expecting to go 
to college.  These data are presented in Table 5.  Classes graduating in 1999 and earlier years 
were not eligible for Merit Awards.   ACT test taking rates were stable from 1997 to 1999.  The 
Merit Award kicked in with the class of 2000 and remarkably the ACT test-taking rate increased 
by 2 percentage points for that class.  Furthermore the share of ACT test takers from minority 
groups also rose in 2000.  This suggests that the Merit Award may have stimulated a larger 
proportionate increase in college going among minority groups than among whites.  
Furthermore, ACT test scores were stable.  This suggests that the increase in the proportion of 
seniors taking the ACT did not lower the average test scores of ACT test takers.   
 
 
Table 5 
Trends in ACT Test Taking and Scores for Michigan 
 
 Graduating Class of: 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Students taking the ACT 66,628 68,769 70,669 73,918 
Mean ACT Score 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.3 
High School seniors during the 
Previous Fall 95,151 99,628 100,384 102,282 
Share of Seniors taking ACT 
Test 70.0 69.0 % 70.4 % 72.3 % 
Share of test takers who were:     
    African-American 9.02 % 9.72 % 9.87 % 9.97 % 
    Asian 2.14 % 2.22 % 2.35 % 2.50 % 
    Hispanic (Mexican, P.R, other) 2.02 % 1.91 % 1.86 % 1.89 % 
     
Number of High School 
Graduates 87,457 92,732 95,500  
 
Source: “ACT High School Profile Report--H.S. Graduating Class 2000:  Michigan.” Data on the number of high 
school graduates is from various issues of the Digest of Education Statistics, Tables 99, 105. October 1 Fall 
headcounts were obtained from Paul Bielawski of the Michigan Dept. of Education. 
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Conclusion 
 I conclude that the case for the Michigan Merit Award program is very strong.  Many, 
probably most, of the Michigan’s secondary school students have not been devoting as much 
time and energy to learning as their parents and the public would like.  Students who blow off 
high school pay a very high price; a much larger price than they imagine when they are in school.  
They imagine they will be able to go to college regardless of low grades, regardless of low 
achievement.  But, in fact, their chances of completing a degree program are almost zero.  They 
are also unaware that applying themselves in high school helps them get jobs that offer training 
and promotion opportunities and eventually higher wage rates.  Consequently, it is sensible for 
state government to purposely try to strengthen incentives to study and to make them absolutely 
transparent to students and parents.  That is exactly what the Merit Award program accomplishes.   
 The Merit Award’s use of the MEAP HST as the primary method for selecting scholarship 
winners creates a moderate-stakes curriculum-based external exit exam system in state of 
Michigan.  Experience with similar examination systems in Canada, New York and North Carolina 
is very positive.  Michigan can reasonably anticipate that the Merit Award program will increase 
student effort and learning, make parents stronger advocates of higher standards, increase 
college attendance and reduce college drop out rates.  
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